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RUTH TRUST, Appellant, v. ARDEN FARMS COMPANY
(a Corporation) et at, R{lspondents.
[1] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
against a defendant who at a time prior to the accident has
relinquished all control of the instrumentality causing the
injury must affirmatively establish that the condition of the
. instrumentality has not changed since it left defendant's
possession.
[2] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-The mere breaking of a milk bottle in a customer's possession while handling
it cannot give rise to an inference that the dairy delivering
the bottle was negligent in failing to discover the defect.
[3] Id.-Exercise of Oare by Vendors.-A dairy is not responsible
for defects in milk bottles that cannot be fonnd by a reasonable, practicable inspection.
[4] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In an action
by a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer
for injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle
broke in her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable as to the dairy where the customer failed to present any
evidence to negate maltreatment of the bottle by her or her
three boys after its delivery three days before the accident,
there being evidence that she had removed the bottle at least
once and used some of its contents during that period, and
that her husband and boys had access to the refrigerator.
[6] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In an action by
a eustomeragainst a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for
injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in
her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable as
to tbe manufacturer where there was no evidence that the
bottle was not mishandled or its"condition changed after it
passed from the manufacturer's control.
~'

[1]
gence,
[2]
gence,

See OaI.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 313 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli§ 300.
See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 332 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli§ 306 et seq.

McK. Dig. References: [lJ Negligence, § 136; [2,4,5,7] Negligence, § 138; [3] Negligence, § 56; [6] Sales, § 290; [8] Food,
§ 1.1(3); [9] Food, § 8(6); [10, 12] Negligence, § 125; [11] Evidence, § 156(3); [13] Evidence, § 453; [14] Evidence, § 457 [15]
Trial, § 62.
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[6] Sales-Breach of Warrant)'-Evidence.-In an action by •
customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in
her hand, there was no basis for claiming any breach of warranty on the part of the dairy where there was no evidence
that t~e bottle was defective when delivered by it to the customer.
[7] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breach of Warrant)'.-The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty.
[8] Food-Regulation-Kilk-Oontainers.-In an action by a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries
sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in her
hand, it was not shown that either defendant had breached
any of the provisions of Agr. Code, § 701, relating to care and
use of containers, where there was no evidence that the bottle
was not "sound, smooth and free from rust" as required by the
code section when delivered by the dairy to the customer's
porch, the only evidence coming from the customer's expert
who testified that the bottle had a "thin" area around the top
but that it did not make the bottle unsafe for the use to which
the dairy applied it.
[9] Id.-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against a dairy
and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was not error
to exclude evidence that there were other containers for milk,
where this evidence was immaterial to any issue before the
court.
[10] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was
proper to exclude evidence that the dairy had delivered six
allegedly defective bottles to the customer's home during the
six months following the accident.
[11] Evidence-Relevancy-Other Acc1dents.-Generally, evidence
of subsequent accidents has no probative tendency to show that
defendant in a personal injury case might reasonably have
anticipated the previous accident, and such evidence is inadmissible.
[12] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was
proper to exclude expert testimony as to whether the bottle
was safe and what the standards for milk bottles ought to be
[11] See Oal.Jur.Sd, Evidence, I§ 143-145; Am.Jur., Evidence,
ISM.
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where the bottle had stood the test of several months' use
and the witness testified that it had no defect that was apparent or could be demonstrated or established and also admitted
that he had no prior experience with milk bottles or the dairy
trade; no foundation was laid for testimony from him regarding what the standards of safety for milk bottles were.
[13] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Quali1ications of Expert Witnesses.-An expert is not qualified as a witness unless it is
shown that he is familiar with the standards required under
similar circumstances.
[14] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Expert Witnesses.The trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of qualification of
an expert will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion.
[16] Trial-View by .Tury.-In an action by a customer against a
dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the
customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, the trial co~
did not err in denying the customer's request that the jury be
permitted to inspect the manufacturer's premises, this being a
matter of discretion for the trial court under Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 610, and there being no showing that denial of inspection
constituted an abuse of discretion.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Edward R. Brand, Judge. Affirmed.
Action against a dairy and a glass manufacturer for personal injuries resulting from a milk bottle breaking in customer's hand. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed.
Jerrold A. Fadem for Appellant.
Belcher, Kearney & Fargo, Louis E. Kearney, Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, Ira C. Powers, Sherman Welpton, Jr., and Steinhart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum.& Ladar for Respondents.
McCOMB, J.-This -is"an action for damages for personal
injuries suffered by plaintiff when a milk bottle she was
handling in her kitchen broke as she was in the process of
setting it down on a tile drainboard.
Defendants are Arden Farms Company, hereinafter called
"Arden," and Owens-Illinois Glass Company, hereinafter
called "Owens."
Owens manufactured a milk bottle which Arden filled with
skim milk and delivered to plaintiff by placing it on her porch
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on a Thursday morning. Plaintiff took the milk bottle into
her home and stored it in a refrigerator.
On the Sunday following the Thursday delivery of the
bottle of skim milk here involved, plaintiff was in the process
of setting the bottle, half filled with milk, down on a tile
drain board when it broke, and she sustained cuts about the
wrist.
The trial court granted defendants' motions for a nonsuit.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, presenting these questions :
First: Was the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable
under the facts of this case as to (a) defendant Arden or (b)
defendant Ou'ens'
No. [1] A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur against a defendant who at a time prior to the
accident has relinquished all control of the instrumentality
causing the injury must affirmatively establish that the condition of the instrumentality has not changed since it left the
possession of defendant. (Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson,
Ltd.,46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [293 P.2d 26] ; Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 42 Ca1.2d 682, 691 [10] [268 P.2d 1041];
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 12] [150
P.2d 436].)
The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson
in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 8upra, as follows: "The
instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they
purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa
loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury
that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which
caused the damage was not mishandled or its condition otkerwe changed ofter control was relinquished by the person
against whom the doctrine is to be opplied." (Italics added.)
[2] In Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 618 [3]
[140 P.2d 369], this court said: "The mere breaking of the
bottle alone cannot give rise to an inference that defendant
was negligent in failing to discover the defect. [3] While
the dairy may have had a duty to make an examination of all
bottles, whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers, it is not responsible for defects that cannot be found
by a reasonable, practicable inspection. (Citations.) In the
present case there is no evidence that a feasible means of
discovering the defect or flaw was available to this defendant.
The language of the court in Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124 [81 S.W.2d 910], is particularly
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appropriate. In holding that res ipsa loquitur 'R n~t applicable to thf\ explosion of a coca-cola bottle, the GOurt eaid
(pp. 911-912) : 'The defendant was not, under the circumstances, an insurer, and it was not shown that there was any
more reasonably practicable method of inspection used in the
industry than the method of inspection admittedly adopted
by the defendant. Suppose the bottle was defective. A conclusion of negligence could not arise without some showing
that the defect could have been discovered by the exercise of
ordinary care. • • . In the instant case we are still left to
conjecture as to the cause of. the defect in the bottle and
its contents or whether it was such a defect as might have
been discovered by a more thorough inspection. Unless we
are prepared to hold defendant as an insurer, it is hard to see
how else it could be held responsible without some showing that
its opportunity to exercise care was in some measure proportionate to the duty imposed-without some showing that a
more thorough inspection would have been dective. Plaintiff's experts suggest various methods of testing bottles which
might be applied, but' it is not shown that. these tests are
commercially practicable or that they would have disclosed
the complained-of defect. . . . We must meBSlJre the duty
by ordinary standards and by consequences reasonably to be
anticipated. Subject to these criteria, it is clear that the
proof falls short of raising any inference of negligence. '
"In Licari v. Markotos, 110 Misc. 334 [180 N.Y.S. 278],
the court held a bottler not liable for injuries caused by
breaking of a bottle of a non-explosive cleaning and dyeing
preparation, saying (p.280 [N.Y.S.]): 'Nor is there any force
in respondent's contention, strenuously urged upon this appeal, that the defendant failed in his duty to inspect the
bottles before filling them; this for the reason that there is no
proof that any examination or inspection would have found
the existence of any defect. U such had been the case, it was
the plaintiff's duty to ~ve evidence thereof. BruckeZ v.
J. Milltau's Son, 116 Api>. Div. [832] 836 [102 N.Y.S. 395].
In the absence of such evidence, the learned trial justice had
no foundation upon which to predicate any finding of negligence on defendant's part, and a judgment for plaintiff could
be based on none other than speculation and pure guesswork.'"
.
[4] <a) With reference to Arden, the record discloses that
on the day the bottle in question, filled with skim milk, had
been delivered to plaintiff's porch, plaintiff had carried the
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container holding that bottle and other bottles of milk into
the house, wiped the bottles, and put them in the refrigerator.
All bottles of milk were stored on one wire shelf in the refrigf'rator, which shelf held eight bottles. The average daily
delivery of milk to plaintiff's home was four bottles. When
plaintiff had placed the bottles of fresh milk on this shelf, she
followed her custom of moving the bottles of older milk
forward on the shelf and storing the bottles of fresh milk
behind them. To this procedure there was one exception.the bottle of skim milk received in the delivery was always
kf'pt at the front of the shelf.
The acddent occurred on Sunday, March 7, 1954, and
involved the bottle of skim milk delivered the preceding
Thursday. Between the time of the delivery of the particular
bottle of skim milk and the time of the accident, the bottle
had been removed at least once by plaintiff and some of the
contents used. Plaintiff had three children, aged 10, 9 and
5 at the time of the accident, each of whom had access to the
milk in the refrigerator. The skim milk bottle was identified
for the children by a band placed around the neck of the
bottle by plaintiff.
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that any of plaintiff's three children, having as they did access to the refrigerator at all times, may have struck the bottle of skim milk
with another bottle and damaged it prior to the time of the
accident, or it may in some other manner or fashion have been
damaged.
The children were not called as witnesses to negate maltreatment of and damage to the bottle by them prior to the
time of the accident. Plaintiff's husband, who also had access
to the refrigerator, was called as a witness, but he made no
attempt to show that the bottle had not been damaged after
it had been received and prior to the time of the accident.
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that the above
stated rule was not met in the present case and that there
is a complete hiatus as to what, if anything, happened to the
bottle between the time it was placed in the refrigerator by
plaintiff and the time the injury occurred. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts of
this ease.
[6] (b) With reference to Owens, there is a total absence
of any evidence that the bottle was not mishandled or its
condition changf'd after it passf'd from Owens' control.
Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable
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and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence
upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly
granted.
[6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part
of Arden'1
No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective
when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no
basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence
and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty.
(Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Oordage 00., 51 Ore. 583
[95 P. 498, 499] ; Poovey v. International Sugar Feed No.2
00.,191 N.C. 722 [133 S.E. 12, 14 [3,4]] ; Stonebrink v. Highland Motors, 171 Ore. 415 [137 P.2d 986, 990] ; cf. Gerber v.
Faber, 54 Ca1.App.2d 674, 686 [4] et seq. [129 P.2d 485].)
[8] Third: Was there any evidence that defendants, 0,.
either of them, breached any of the provisions of section '101
of the Agricultural 00det2
No. There was no evidence that the bottle in question was
not CCsound, smooth and free from rust" as rt'quired by
section 701 of the Agricultural Code when delivered by Arden
to plaintiff's porch. The only evidence on this subject came
from plaintiff's expert, who testified that the bottle had a
SPlaintift' and defendant Owens stipulated that plaintiff had no C&WIe
of action for a breach of warranty against defendant Owens.
·Section 701 of the Agriculturlll Code reads:
Ie (a) Every restaurant, sehool, hospital, BOda fountain or other plaee
where food or drink is lerved to the public, which sells milk, cream, iee
eream, ice milk, buttermilk or any combination thereof for consumption
on the premises, upon emptying the containers thereof, which are to be
:returned to the milk distributor or manufacturer, shall caule such eon·
tainers, elI:cept gl8.118 containers, to be rinsed and drained.
"(b) All containers of milk, cream or producta thereof which are
delivered to the eonsumer by any retailer or distributor and which are
to be returned to such retailer or distributor shall be rinsed and drained
before they are returned.
._
•• (e) All containers exceptiingle serviee containers of any kind
in which milk or any produet of milk is kept, stored, transported or
delivered, shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams and at
all times kept in a condition which will permit thorough clE'ansing of
all Burfaces with which the milk or its products come in contact. Containers including iee cream cabin eta commonly used or intended for the
reception, storage or delivery of milk, cream or products thereof shall be
used exclusively for the storsge and use of milk and milk products and
ahall not be used for any other purpose. All empty containers delivered
to any producer, manufacturer, retailer or distributor for the reception
of milk or any product of milk shall be kept in a clean, sanitary, and
sterile condition and shall be used for no other purpose."

· ~ TauST
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"thin" area around the top but that it did not make such
bottle unsafe for the use to which Arden applied it.'
[9] Fourth: Did the trial court err in excluding olered
et1idence'
No. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in not
permitting her to introduce evidence:
(a> That there were other containers for milk such as round
bottles, stippled bottles, cardboard cartons, and others.
This evidence was clearly immaterial to any issue before
the court. Although glass is subject to breakage, it has many
qualities as a food container which no paper container can
fulfill, e.g., lower porosity, impermeability to odor, transparency, and cleanliness.
[10] (b) That Arden had delivered six allegedly defective
milk bottles to plaintill"s home during the six months following the accident.
This evidence was also properly excluded. [Ul It is the
general rule that evidence of subsequent accidents has no
probative tendency to show that a defendant might reasonably
have anticipated the previous accident, and therefore such
evidence is inadmissible. (McOormick v. Great Western Power
00.,214 Cal. 658, 668 [5]. [8 P.2d 145, 81 A.L.R. 678].>
[It] Fifth: Did the triaZ court unduly limit the examina.tion of the expert witness, Benson'
No. Plaintiff contends that the witness should have been
permitted to testify as to whether the bottle was safe and what
the standards for milk bottles ought to be.
This testimony was properly excluded for the reason that
the bottle had stood the test of at least several months' use
and the witness testified that the bottle had no defect that
'Was apparent or could be demonstrated or established. He
also admitted that he had had no prior experience with milk
bottles or the dairy trade. Therefore, no foundation was laid
for testimony from him regarding what the standards of
safety for milk bottles were.
[13, 1'] The rule is settled that an expert is not qualified
as a witness unless it is shown that he is familiar with the
"The witneee testified:
"The Court: (Interrupting) There Im't aD1 question but what thbIIler
glaBs is more susceptible to breakage thaD thicker glass, but is it of
n.cb a degree that it would make the bottle, as a unit, unsafe, or have
an effect on its I&fet1-have aD effect on its I&fet1 tor the 1lH for
whleh it is intended?
"The Witneee: J woulc1D't 111.1 that, u."
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standards required under similar circumstances (Huffmq.n v.
Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [9] [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d
485]) ; also, that the trial court's ruling upon the sufficiency
of the qualification of an expert will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.
(Beres/ord v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Ca1.2d 738, 749 [13]
[290 P.2d 498, 54 A.L.R.2d 910]; Bennett v. Los ,Angeles
Tumor Institute, 102 Cal.App.2d 293,296 [4] [227 P.2d 473] ;
Budat v. Carithers, 137 Cal.App. 92, 97 [3] [30 P.2d 435].)
In the present case the evidence did not meet the above
requirements.
[15] Sixth: Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's

request that the jury be permitted to inspect Owens' premises'
No. Section 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
"When, in the opinion of the Court, it is proper for the jury
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred, it
may order them to be conducted, in a body, under the charge
of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by
some person appointed by the Court for that purpose. While
the jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person
so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected
with the trial." (Italics added.)
It is thus evident that the matter of inspection is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of
a showing of abuse of discretion, as in the present case, the
trial court's denial of an inspection will not be disturbed on
appeal. (Nunneley v. Edgar HoteZ, 86 Cal.2d 493, 501 [6]
[225 P.2d 497] ; Laguna Salada etc. Dist. v. Pacific DetJ. Co.,
119 Cal.App.2d 470, 477 [14] [259 P.2d 498].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurrmg and Dissenting.-I concur in the
judgment insofar ~ !t sustains the granting of nonsuit as to
Owens-Illinois Glass Company, but disagree with a similar
conclusion reached in connection with defendant Arden
Farms.

The majority concludes that plaintiff failed to present any
evidence to negate maltreatment of the bottle by her and her
family after its delivery, and thus, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply. It is also held that there is no
evidence to support a finding of breach of warranty since no
1tCM-4
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defect in the bottle had been shown to exist. On the basis
of the facts as stated in the majority opinion these conclUl';icms
are warranted. However, it is submitted that there are
material omissions in the majority's factual statement, which,
when viewed according to the rule ou nonsuit, renders such
conclusions erroneous.
The record reveals that plaintiff established the following
uncontroverted facts. The bottle in question was manufactured by Owens sometime in 1953; part of the manufacturing
process required that Arden's name be written on the bottle.
Shortly thereafter the bottle was sent to Arden and used in
their business of delivering milk for the months preceding the
time of breaking in 1954. At the manufacturing stage bottles
are subjected to a test for visual defects, and in addition,
manufacturer Owens conducts statistical tests for latent defects. These statistical tests consist of taking a certain number
of bottles from the production line and subjecting them to
thermal-shock impact tests which reveal any latent defects.
This test is regarded as 95-98 per cent effective in insuring
th.at the remaining bottles not so tested will be free from
hidden defects. At the bottling level, Arden inspects new as
well as returned bottles for visual defects to discover any
damage that might have occurred in shipping or while in use,
but no test is maintained to discover latent defects.
Plaintiff's expert witness testified that he had examined
the reconstructed parts of the broken bottle and that the cause
of the bottle's breaking was impact, but that from {)bserving
the fragmentation pattern of the percussion eone and the
absence of spalling (chipping and shattering) the' eontact
was extremely mild. He further stated that an analysis of
the fragmentation pattern led him to the conclusion that the
bottle could have only broken because of a defect. His study
indicated that the defect was at the base of . the bottle, but
it was impossible to determine its precise nature.
Plaintiff's milk delivery consisted of four quarts of milk,
including a quart of skim milk, every other day, which was
placed on a refrigerator shelf having space for eight quarts.
The quart of skim milk being distinguished from the other
hottles by a blue rubber band placed around its neck.
As to· the treatment of the bottle after it was delivered,
plaintiff testified that she was always careful with the milk
bottles, and that the skim milk while kept on the same shelf
as the homogenized milk was apart from it, permitting access
to .the homogenized milk without disturbing the skim milk.
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Plaintiif also stated that no member of her family, including
the children, had ever broken any bottles, and that no one
but herself used the skim milk. No objection was made to the
evidence of past acts of due care.
The question before this court is whether disregarding conflictingevidence, giving to the plaintiff's evidence all the
value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging in every
legitimate inference which may be drawn from that evidence,
the evidence is of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict
in favor of plaintiif (see Leonard v. Watsonville Community
Hospital,47 Ca1.2d 509, 514-515 [305 P.2d 36]).
Reading the evidence presented against the background -of
this rule, it must be concluded that plaintiff has established a
prima facie case against Arden based upon three possible
theories: (1) negligence by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur; (2) negligence by proof of specific acts; and (3)
breach of warranty, rendering the nonsuit improper in this
regard. However, as to Owens, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case based either on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur or specific acts of negligence, and since plaintiff
stipulated that no breach of warranty action existed against
Owens the granting of the nonsuit in this respect was proper.
In connection with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it may
be invoked where (1) defendant had exclusive control of the
instrumentality causing the injury, and (2) the accident is of
such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the
absence of negligence of defendant (see Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Ca1.2d 453, 457-458 [150 P.2d 436]). The
exclusive control requirement is modified to the extent that
if defendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent
act and plaintiif proves that the condition of the instrumentality causing the injury had not changed after it left defendant's possession, then plaintiif may avail himself of the
doctrine providing the other-eondition is satisfied (see Honea
v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 617-618 [140 P.2d 369] ;
Escola v. Coca Cola Boftling Co., supra, 458). The extent of
plaiptiif's burden of proving that the condition of the instrumentality is unchanged is fully discussed in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., supra, 458-459, where it is stated:" It is
not necessary, of course, that plaintiff eliminate every remote
possibility of injury to the bottle after defendant lost control,
and the requirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting
a reasonable inference that it was not accessible to extraneous
harmful forces and that it was carefully handled by plaintiff
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or any third person who may have moved or touched it. [Citation.] If such evidence is presented, the question becomes
one for the trier of fact [citation], and accordingly, the issue
should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions."
(See also Zentz v. Coca Cola BottZing Co., 39 Ca1.2d 436,
444 [247 P.2d 344].)
Contrary to the majority opinion there is evidence which
(~an form the basis of a reasonable inference that the condition
of the bottle had not changed. Plaintiff testified that she
handled the bottle with due care. This evidence is suflicient
to satisfy the requirement that the bottle had not changed
insofar as plaintift's handling is concerned (see Honea v. City
Dairy, Inc., supra, 618). While there is no direct evidence that
the bottle was carefully handled by third persons having
access to it, there is circumstantial evidence on which a
reasonable inference can be predicated that these persons
exercised due care in handling the milk bottle, if they handled
it at all. Plaintiff stated that no one in her family had ever
broken a bottle. She added that the bottle was not used by
any other member of her family. Such sole use being guaranteed by the fact the bottle was designated by a blue rubber
band, its purpose known to all members of the household. It
was further established that while all the milk bottles were
kept on the same shelf, the skim was kept "apart" from the
homogenized milk. It may be inferred from the fact that the
shelf had space for eight bottles, and only four were delivered
every other day, that being "apart" was or suflicient degree
that access to the homogenized milk was possible without
disturbing the skim milk. From the combination of the facts
that the skim milk was used only by plaintiff, and that no
member of the family had ever broken a bottle, plus the inference that the skim milk was "apart" permitting access
to other bottles, a jury could reasonably conclude that the
third persons did not touch the skim milk or if they did it was
done with due care.
Having met the burden of showing that her conduct and
her family's action did not in any way deviate from the exercise of due care, which consequently excludes the possibility
of the accident being caused by plaintiff or her family, plaintiff can now invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by showing that the manner in which the bottle was broken does not
ordinarily happen without negligence for which Arden is
probably responsible.
The substantive content of this requirement has been vari-
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able, and it is necessary to review the cases discussing it. As
a preliminary point all cases agree that bottlers of beverages,
including dairies, have a duty of care to inspect bottles
whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers (see
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., supra, 618; Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., supra, 460; Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33
Ca1.2d 514, 517 [203 P.2d 522] ; Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., supra, 448). In Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., supra, it was
held that the breaking of a milk bottle is alone insufficient
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to permit the additional
and necessary inference of negligence by defendant, either in
causing the defective condition or in failing to discover it by
proper inspection. However, in reaching this conclusion a
rule was suggested that where plaintiff can demonstrate that
there was a defect and there were reasonable means of discovering the defect in the exercise of due care, then this
constitutes sufficient evidence from which to infer that it is
more probable than not defendant was negligent in failing
to discover the defect. This suggested rule was adopted in
Escola v. Coca Cola BottUng Co., supra, 458, and again in
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supra. In the Escola case this
court permitted the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur after plaintiff had established that no unreasonable
extraneous force had acted upon the bottle subsequent to
delivery, and upon the ground there was an inference that
defendant failed to exercise due care in inspecting the bottle
since it could be determined from the evidence that the bottle
had a visual defect that could have been ascertained by a
reasonable inspection. The evidence relied upon to create
such an inference dealt with the inspection methods in the
industry. Following the Escola case this court was faced with
a similar question in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supra, and
the Escola rule was followed. To summarize the law as it
existed after the Aztec Brewfng Company case, plaintiff was
entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases
involving bursting or breaking bottles where (1) there was
a showing that no external harmful force touched the bottle
after leaving defendant's control and (2) where evidence was
presented that the bottle contained a defect that could be
discovered by a practicable and reasonable inspection.
In Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, the former requirement was retained while the latter was altered materially.
The rule this court announced therein stated that plaintiff
may invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where he introduces
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evidence sufticient to warrant an inference that the bottle was
not mistreated subsequent to its delivery by defendant and
where the accident was of such a nature that it can be said, in
the light of past experience, that it probably was the result
of negligence by someone and defendant is probably the person who is responsible (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra,
446). The C!lurt determined that if plainti1f demonstrated
that he was not an intervening cause, the happening of the
exploding bottle gave rise to an inference of negligent conduct on the part of the defendant. This ruling leads to the
conclusion that it is no longer necessary to present evidence
that the defect could have been discovered by a practicable
and reasonable inspection before the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be invoked. The test now is whether from the
happening of the accident it is more probable than not that
defendant was negligent.
Applying this rule to the case at bar it is clear that an
inference of negligence arises from the breaking of the bottle.
Plainti1f has established that no harmful intervening forces
touched the bottle after it left defendant's control; common
experience tells us that glass milk bottles, when handled as
plainti1f did, do not ordinarily break, and since Arden has
a duty to inspect bottles for visual defects, it is more probable
that a dangerous bottle was placed on the market by a negligent act of Arden, and it is, therefore, responsible for the
damage caused. Moreover, in this case we have expert testimony that the bottle broke as a result of a defect, which
renders the inference that defendant was negligent in either
wholly failing to inspect the bottle, or in failing to make a
reasonable inspection all the more probable. This probability
is further underscored by the principle that the possibility
of the defect in the bottle being latent and not visually discoverable is regarded as insufficient to prevent the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (Zentz v. Coca Cola BotlUng Co., '''Fa, 449).
.
I am unconvinced by the distinction attempted to be drawn
in the Zentz case between bottles that contain carbonated beverages and bottles that contain milk or noncarbonated beverages (see dissenting opinion, Honea v. City Dairy, Inc.,
lUpra, 623). The question is not whether the bottle contains
carbonated or noncarbonated beverages, but whether it is safe
to use for the purpose designed. If a bottle containing milk
breaks in a customer's hand, the inference of defendant'.
negligence is no less probable than if a bottle containing a
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carbonated beverage explodes. In either case the bottle was
not safe for its proposed use because of some defect from which
we infer a bottler's negligence in failing to discover it. The
nature of the beverage adds nothing to this inference.
In addition," plaintiff's evidence would support a finding
that Arden failed to reasonably inspect the bottle, violating
its duty of care. As discussed previously, plaintiff and her
family did not mistreat the bottle subsequent to its delivery
by defendant, and what is the corollary, the ~efect was in
existence prior to plaintiff's handling. Owens established
that their inspection for latent defects is 95-98 per cent infallible, which plaintiff's expert substantiated, further stating
that he found no latent defect in the bottle. This evidence
plus the fact that the bottle was in use for several months by
Arden sustains a reasonable inference that the bottle had no
latent defects, and the defect that did exist was a visible one.
From the foregoing it follows that the defect was one that defendant should have discovered when inspecting the bottles
and failure to do so constitutes negligent conduct which the
jury could find proximately caused plaintiff's injury.
The evidence presented by plaintiff, as indicated above, also
supports a cause of action predicated on breach of implied
warranty under section 1735 of the Civil Code. In substance
section 1735 provides that the seller of goods impliedly warrants to the buyer who relies on the seller's skill that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for the purpose sold or if a sale by
description the goods are of merchantable quality. Preliminary to maintaining an action for breach" of warranty the
California eases require privity,· i.e., the buyer can only sue
his immediate seller (Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d
682, 695-696 [268 P.2d 1041]), notice (Whitfield v. Jessup,
31 Ca1.2d 826, 828 [193 P.2d 1]), sale (Mix v. Ingersoll
Candy Co., 6 Ca1.2d 674, 676 [59 P.2d 144]"), and a reliance
on the seller's judgment that tll~(goods are fit for the purpose
sold (Civ. Code, § 1735)._ ,-'
These prerequisites have been satisfied. It is clear plaintiff
was in privity with Arden, that proper notice was given and
that plaintiff relied on Arden's judgment that the bottle was
·California admits an exception to the privity requirement in eases
involving foodstuft's· where it is held that an implied warranty of fitness
for human consumption runs from the manufacturer to the ultimate
consumer regardless of privity of contract. (Klein v. Duche811 Sandu'ich
00 .• Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272 [93 P.2d 799]; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.
App.2d 687, 689 [163 P.2d 470].)
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safe as a container for milk. However, a question does arise
as to whether there was a sale of the bottle. This has never
been authoritatively answered in California and there is a
split among the eases in other jurisdictions that have considered the question, but the weight of authority is that there
is a sale of the bottle. In Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127
Conn. 44 [15 A.2d 181], it was held that the warranty under
the sales act extends to a returnable beverage container, ruling
that there had been a sale of the bottle. To the same effect,
McIntyre v. Kamas City Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Mo.), 85
F.Supp. 708, 711; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d
317] ; Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108
N.E.2d 757]. In two other states, New Jersey and New York,
the courts have ruled that in the sale of consumer goods in a
bottle, the seller warrants the fitness of the container as much
as the contents on the ground that the container is an essential part of the transaction, it being immaterial whether the
bottle is sold with the contents or subject to a refund of deposit or return. (Cooper v. Newman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 319; see
Hea!ey v. Trodd, 124 N.J.L. 64 [11 A.2d 88].)
The jurisdictions that have denied extending the warranty
to the container have done so on the grounds either that
the container was not covered by the act (Poplar v. Hochschild,
Kohn &- Co., 180 Md. 389 [24 A.2d 783]), or that the Uniform Sales Act had not been adopted in their jurisdiction
(Boter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302
[193 P.2d 575, 4 A.L.R.2d 458]). In the only California
ease, the court, in dictum, discussed the question in a light
that does not speak favorably of extending warranty to the
container (Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal.App.2d 674, 687-688 [129
P.2d 485]). However, this ease is by no means conclusive
and should not operate to prevent this court from considering
the problem as an original proposition.
I am persuaded that the more reasoned rule, supported by
the realities of the situation is that the warranty extends to
the milk bottle whether returnable or not, there being a "sale"
of the milk bottle within the meaning of that word as it is
used in Civil Code, section 1735, when it is delivered to a
customer. In fact the buyer had no choice but to accept the
bottles delivered by Arden. They were selected solely by the
seller for the purpose of containing milk, and placed at the
buyer's doorstep by Arden's choice alone. Since a container
is necessary for the sale of milk, Arden in any such sale must
provide a container suitable for the purpose and the failure
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to provide such container would render the sale of milk as we
know it today commercially impossible. Thus, the dairy's sale
involves the container as much as the milk. The fact the
bottle may be returned does not prevent there being a "sale"
of it, for 'returning bottles is not mandatory upon the customer, who may keep it in his discretion, but returns it as a
matter of convenience to himself and the dairy, which in turn
saves him additional expense in purchasing milk.
With the preliminary requirements satisfied it is now
possible to consider whether the evidence would support a
verdict that there has been a breach of implied warranty.
This question involves ascertaining what it is that Arden
impliedly warrants. Plaintiff contends the implied warranty
is that the bottle is fit for the purpose for which it is supplied,
namely as a container for milk, and that when a defective
bottle is placed on the market there is a breach of this warranty, which renders Arden absolutely liable to an immediate
buyer without proof of negligence for any injury caused by
the defect.
Normally it is a policy question whether a particular warranty should be imposed, which imposition requires the court
to choose a party who is best suited to bear the burden of
absolute liability in order to protect the consumer who is not
in a position to do so himself (see concurring opinions, Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., $upra, 462-464; Gordon v. Aztec
Brewing Co., supra, 530). Fortunately in this case we are
aided in our policy decision by a statement of legislative intent
which strongly suggests that the implied warranty argued for
is to be applied. This statement is found in section 701 of
the Agricultural Code and provides in part: "(c) All containers except single service containers of any kind in which
milk or any product of milk is kept, stored, transported or
delivered, shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams
and at aU times kept in a condition which will permit thorough
cleansing of all surfaces witp. which the milk or its products
come in contact. . . ." This section creates a duty on the
part of all suppliers of milk products to use sound bottles
and thereby argues powerfully for the proposition that an
implied warranty in this respect is to be imposed. Certainly
section 701 permits us to wean ourselves from the belief that
such a warranty is against traditional practices. Adding to
the force of the statute, cases where implied warranties have
been found to exist, such as food cases referred to above,
and cases involving fitness and strength of component parts
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of machinery (TremeroU v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102
Oal.App.2d 464 [227 P.2d 923]) there seems little or ·no
reason for determining that such a warranty does not exist
in this case. To the contrary all authority and reason press
for the application of such a warranty since Arden is in
the better position to know of the quality of the thing dealt
with and may forestall any injury to its customers, who
obviously refre,in from taking protective care in reliance on
the seller removing all dangers of defective bottles. And
Jinally as a matter of policy a warranty should be imposed
on the grounds that "The cost of an injury and the loss of
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business." (Concurring opinion,
E.cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, 462.) Arden can be
held to impliedly warrant, therefore, that all milk bottles
will be safe for normal use and free from any unreasonable
dangerous defects;
To render Arden liable under the warranty theory plaintiff must show that the goods were unreasonably dangerous
either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or
for some special use which was brought to the attention of
the seller, and that the unreasonably dangerous condition
existed when the goods left the seller's hands (Mu: ·v. Ingerson Canily Co., npra; Silva v. P. W. W ooZworth Co., 28 Cal.
App.2d 649 [83 P.2d 76]). The same evidence used to establish the theories of negligence also may be applied to demonstrate that there was a defect, which rendered the ordinary
use of the bottle dangerous, and that it existed prior to plainiff's acquisition. Having introduced evidence to support the
essential elements in a breach of warranty action Arden is
liable regardless of any proof of negligence.
Turning to the question of the correctness of the nonsuit
as to Owens we need discuss only the theories of negligence
in view of the stipulation pertaining to breach of warranty.
As far as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned, it
appears that based upon past experience we cannot say that
from the breaking of the bottle it is more probable than not
Owens was negligent. The evidence established that the defect
was a visible one and not latent, indicating that Owens performed its duty to inspect for latent defects with due care.
Secondly the bottle was in use for several months after its
delivery to Arden. The inference from this evidence is that
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the defect developed sometime after Arden put it to use
since past experience and common knowledge tell us that if
the defect that existed at the time of the breaking, existed
when the bottle was acquired by Arden, the bottle would have
been broken in Arden's plant or by the first several customers
using it. Because it did not break the most probable inference
is that the bottle left Owens free of defects.
Nor can the res ipsa loquitur doctrine be invoked on the
ground that plaintiff is in doubt as to which defendant is
liable. Plaintiff relies on Ybarra v.Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486
[154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], and Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91], but in those cases
the application of the doctrine was permitted because plaintiff was faced with the dilemma of being able to prove a
negligent act, but unable to prove which of the multiple
defendants committed the act. In the instant case plaintiff is
not faced with such dilemma, but is able to show exactly which
defendant was negligent and what the nature of this negligence was. Under such circumstance plaintiff cannot claim
multiple defendants justifies invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
As for proving Owens committed specific acts of negligence
the record is devoid of any evidence which would support
such a finding.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed as to defendant Owens, but reversed with
respect to defendant Arden Farms.
'!RAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The evidence
that plaintiff handled the bottle carefully and that the impaet causing it to break was only a mild ont' was sufficient
to apport a finding that it was defective when Ardens Farms

dt!tivered it to plaintiff. It is reasonable to infer not only that

this impact occurred when~ plaintiff placed the bottle on the
dmin board but that it was no more severe than the normal
impact attending such "'placement. Therefore plaintiff's expst could justifiably conclude that the bottle was defective
in lOme way at the time it broke, even though he could not
delermine the nature of the defect from an examination of
t1Ie broken bottle. It could reasonably be inferred that no
oIier member of plaintiff's family handled the bottle, since
. . was the only one who used skimmed milk and it was her
catom to identify the bottle of such milk with a rubber band
. . to set it to one side of the milk-bottle tray in therefrig-
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erator. Conceivably others in the family could have strock
the other bottles against that one; but that possibility is
remote given the evidence that no member of the family had
ever broken a milk bottle. Milk bottles are ordinarily sturdy
enough to withstand the impacts of normal usage. The bottle
in question was not, and it is therefore reasonable to conclude
that it was defective when delivered to plaintiff. (See Gordon
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Ca1.2d 514, 532 [203 P.2d 522],
concurring opinion.)
Although I believe that there is also sufficient evidence
of the other elements of a cause of action for breach of warranty, I would emphasize that "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies
of the law of sales." (Ketterer v. Armour cf; Co., 200 F. 322,
323; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Ca1.2d 272, 282
[93 P.2d 799].) Liability should not be determined mechanically by fortuitous circumstances. It should not be controlling
that the injury occurs after rather than before a sale. (Compare Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108
N.E.2d 757, 759] [bottle exploded after it was taken from
vending machine: warranty] with Latlky v. Economy Grocer!l
Stores, 319 Mass. 224 [65 N.E.2d 305, 307] [bottle exploded
before customer in self-service store carried it past the check
stand: no warranty].) It should not be controlling that the
bottle is sold rather than bailed. (See Cooper v. Newman, 11
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320; Geddling v. Marsh [1920], 1 K.B. 668,
672-673.) It should not be controlling that the consumer is
found to be in privity of contract with the defendant rather
than not. (See Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.
2d 272 [93 P.2d 799].) The liability of the manufacturer
should not turn on whether he has "contracted" to assume it
under such erratic tests that haphazardly afford recovery to
some and deny it to others. "[P]ublic policy demands t.hat
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products
that reach the market." (Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Ca1.2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436], concurring opinion; sec
2 Harper and James, Torts, pp. 1570 et seq.)
In the Escola case, as in Gordon v. Aztec Brewi11gCo.,
33 Ca1.2d 514 [203 P.2d 522], the court invoked res ipsa loquitur to affirm judgments for damages resulting from explosions
of beverage bottles. My own concurrence in those judgments
rested on the ground that "it should now be recognized that
a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
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that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to human beings." (24 Ca1.2d at 461.) I adhere to that
view and. would therefore reverse the judgment of nonsuit
in favor of Arden Farms in this case.
Although this court in Burr v. SheruJin W,1liams Co., 42
Ca1.2d 682, 695-696 [268 P.2d 1041], refused to extend strict
liability to property damage in the absence of privity of eontract or an express representation of the manufacturer relied
upo~ by the ultimate purchaser, it has recognized that manufacturers are strictly liable to the consumer in eases of foodstuffs. (Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Ca1.2d 272
[93 P.2d 799].) To date a majority of the court have solved
the problem of liability for harm caused by defective food
containers in terms of negligence without considering strict
liability as an alternative ground of recovery. (Honea v.
City Dai'l/, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614 [140 P.2d 369]; E.cola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Ca1.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436] ; Gordon
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514 [203 P,2d 522] ; Zentz v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436 [247 P.2d 344].) Whatever the arguments for limiting the manufacturer's strict liability to foodstuffs, there is no rational basis for differentiating between foodstuffs and their containers. (Nichols v.
Nold, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d 317, 323] ; Cooper v. Newman,
n N.Y.8.2d 319, 320; Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App.Div. 831
[292 N.Y.8. 586, 587] ; McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola
Bottling Co. (Mo), 85 Fed.Supp. 708, 711; Mahoney v.
Shaker Bgaare Beverages, OhioC. P., 102 N.E.2d 281, 289;
Geddli"l1 v. Mar.h, [1920] 1 K.B. 668, 672-673; Morelli v.
Fitch au Gibbon., [1928] 2 K.B. 636, 642-644; see Prosser,
Torts, ltd ed.] § 84, p. 509.) It would clarify the law to repudiate fllat dUferentiation openly rather than to circumvent
it covertly and haphazardly by leaving juries free to impose
strict liability if they so choos~,' under the guise of res ipsa
loquitur. (See concurring ~pinion in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Ca1.2d 514,532 [203 P.2d 522], and ca.c;es citc:d.)
There ill no evidence that the bottle was defective when
it was &livered to Arden Farms by Owens-Illinois. Since
it withstGod usage by Arden Farms and its cusiomers for
many DIOIlths, the only reasonable inference is that it was
not defettive when Owens-Illinois delivered it to Arden
Farms. The nonsuit in favor of Owens-Illinois was therefore
proper 1IIlder any theory of liability. I would therefore affirm
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the judgment as to defendant Owens-Illinois and reverse it as
to defendant Arden Farms.
GIBSON, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.-It is clear
that, as to Owens, the judgment of nonsuit should be affirmed.
Th.e parties stipulated that plaintiff had no cause of action
against Owens for breach of warranty, and she failed to make
a prima facie case against this defendant based on negligence.
Although there is substantial evidence that the breaking of the
bottle resulted from a defect in it, there is no evidence from
which it can be inferred that this defect was present when
the bottle was delivered by Owens to Arden, who thereafter
used it for several months before it broke.
With respect to Arden, however, I am of the vi('w that the
judgment of nonsuit should be rt'versed, because the evidence
is not insufficient as a matter of law to sustain plaintiff's
cause of action for breach of warranty. As shown by the
discussion in the concurring and dissenting opinions I)f Justices Carter and Traynor, there is testimony from which t11('
jury could reasonably infer that the bottle was not improperly
handled in plaintiff's home and that when th(' bottle was
delivered by Arden it contained a defect which caused it to
break. If an inference to that effect were drawn by the
jury, the defect in the bottle would constitute a· breach of
warranty by Arden under section 1735 of the Civil Cod('
(Uniform Sales Act, § 15), which reads in part: "SUbject
to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf,
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality
or :fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under
a contract·to sell or a sale, except as follows: (1) Where the
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably :fit for such purpose. (2) Where the goods are bought
by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality." (Italics added.)
Section 1735 does not refer merely to goods sold but to all
IC goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale."
It has
been held that when bottled beverages are sold, the bottles
in which they necessarily must be delivered are supplied
"nder the contract of sale within the meaning of the statute
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although the bottles are bailed rather than sold. (GeddUng v.
Marsh (1920), 1 K.B. 668; see 1 Williston on Sales (rev.
ed. 1948),582, n. 1.) The Geddling ease related to a sale of
"lime juice and soda" in bailed bottles and was decided under
section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which
contains provisions nearly identical with those quoted above
from section 1735. The findings in that case showed that the
sale came within the first subdivision of the section, but the
reasoning of the court is equally applicable to a sale coming
within the second subdivision. Accordingly, ·even if we
assume that the bottle involved here was bailed, it would be
subject to any warranty which would be applicable under
either of the quoted subdivisions if the bottle had been sold.
The sale of a bottle of milk by a dairy under the circumstances appearing here clearly comes within the language of
the second subdivision of the statute, and the seller's implied
warranty of merchantable quality under this provision includes a warranty that his product is reasonably fit for the
general purpose for which goods of that kind are sold. (See
Simmons v. Rhodes ([; Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 194 [293
P.2d 26] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,42 Cal.2d 682, 694
(268 P.2d 1041].) It is obvious that a milk bottle which is so
defective that it will break under normal handling is not
fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended and that
the delivery of such a defective bottle constitutes a breach of
warranty.
The buyer may recover for breach of the statutory warranty
without proving negligence on the part of the seller. (TremeroU v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464, 475
[227 P.2d 923] ; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687,
689 [163 P.2d 470]; 1 Williston on Sales (rev. ed. 1948),
617.) Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider in this
dissent whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment upon the theory that Arde.n was negligent. Likewise
it is not necessary to discuss whet.herour decision in Honea v.
City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d '614 [140 P.2d 369], precludes
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under the evidence
presented here.
I would affirm the judgment with respect to Owens and
reverse it with respect to Arden.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 21,
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.
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